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What Happened on Deliberation Day?
David Schkadet
Cass R. Sunsteintt
Reid Hastiettt
What are the effects of deliberation about legal and political
issues by like-minded people? This Essay reports the results of an
experimental investigation involving sixty-three citizens in Colorado.
Groups from Boulder, a predominantly liberal city, met to discuss
global warming, affirmative action, and civil unions for same-sex
couples. Groups from Colorado Springs, a predominately
conservative city, discussed the same issues. The major effect of
deliberation was to make group members more extreme in their views
than they were before they started to talk. Liberals became more
liberal on all three issues; conservatives became more conservative.
As a result of intragroup deliberation, the division between the
citizens of Boulder and the citizens of Colorado Springs significantly
increased. Deliberation also increased consensus and significantly
reduced diversity within the groups. Even anonymous statements of
personal opinion became more extreme and less diverse after
deliberation. Because political views are often distributed along
geographical lines, these findings are highly likely to be replicated in
actual deliberative processes unless safeguards and careful
procedures are introduced.
INTRODUCTION
The American constitutional system aspires to be a deliberative
democracy--one that combines accountability with a high degree of
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reflection.1 Embracing this deliberative ideal, many people have explored the
foundations of political deliberation and its implications for legal and political
reform. 2 An evident hope is that deliberation will lead people to accurate
understandings and sensible solutions to social problems. Emphasizing that
hope, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have argued on behalf of a formal
"Deliberation Day," designed to foment citizen deliberation. 3 But under what
circumstances is this hope realistic? What are the likely effects of deliberation
on judgments about law and politics?
It should be clear that in order for deliberation to realize its promise, a
reasonable variety of views must be expressed and discussed. Without exposure
to competing views, citizens cannot engage in a balanced and informed
weighing of positions-a prerequisite of effective deliberation. But sufficient
diversity is unlikely if people sort themselves into homogeneous groups, or if
citizens are segregated geographically; sheer demographics may well mean that
many social groups consist of like-minded people.4 In fact, there is evidence
that different communities in the United States are becoming more
homogeneous in ideological terms.5 To the extent that this is so, deliberating
groups may lack the requisite diversity. What are the effects of deliberation "in
these ideologically sorted groups? Perhaps they spread falsehoods rather than
truth, or produce confusion rather than clarity.
We created an experiment in political deliberation, designed to examine
the effects of deliberation on communities of people having relatively
homogenous views-a special kind of Deliberation Day. In this experiment,
citizens from two cities in Colorado were assembled into several groups, each
containing about six people from a particular city. The groups were asked to
deliberate about three highly-contested issues: global warming, affirmative
action, and same-sex civil unions. The two cities were Boulder, which is known
by its voting patterns to be a predominantly liberal city, and Colorado Springs,
known by its voting pattems to be a mainly conservative enclave. 6 Citizens
were first asked to record their views individually and anonymously. After this
initial survey, the citizens deliberated about the three issues together and were
1. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON (1994).
2. See JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (1996) (elaborating
deliberative conception of democracy); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998)
(collecting diverse treatments of deliberative democracy); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996) (defending deliberative democracy and discussing its
preconditions).
3. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004).
4. See DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER SIDE 46-48 (2006).
5. See id.; see also Bill Bishop, The Great Divide, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (2004),
http://www.statesman.com/greatdivide (showing increased uniformity within communities,
defined in geographical terms).
6. David Leip, Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 2004 Presidential
General Election Data Graphs Colorado, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/
datagraph.php?year=-2004&fips=8&f-O&off=O&elect-0 (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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instructed to reach a group consensus on each issue. After deliberation,
individual participants were asked to record their post-deliberation views, again
individually and anonymously.
The effects of deliberation on participants were simple. First, the groups
from Boulder became more liberal on all three issues; the groups from
Colorado Springs became more conservative. Deliberation with like-minded
groups thus shifted individual opinions toward more extremity. Second,
deliberation increased consensus and decreased diversity. Many of the groups
showed substantial heterogeneity in individual opinions before deliberation
began. As a result of a brief discussion period, group members showed
significantly more agreement and less heterogeneity, not only in their public
statements but also in their anonymous post-deliberation expressions of their
private views. Third, deliberation sharply increased the disparities between the
views of the largely liberal citizens of Boulder and those of the largely
conservative citizens of Colorado Springs. Before deliberation, there was
considerable overlap between many individuals in the two cities. After
deliberation, the overlap in views was much smaller.
The simplest statement of our findings is that deliberation among like-
minded people produced ideological amplification-an amplification of
preexisting ideological tendencies, in which group discussion leads to greater
extremism. If our experimental findings translate to the real world, deliberation
will amplify the ideological tendencies of like-minded people, decrease internal
group diversity, and create greater divisions across ideological lines. These
effects should be expected whenever groups sort themselves along political
lines in purely geographical terms; they should also occur when the sorting
occurs through a person's voluntary decisions about what to read in the
newspaper and watch on television.7
Various kinds of ideological amplification have been established in other
experimental settings, but the phenomenon has received little attention in the
context of contested political issues. As we shall see, our experimental design
diverges from related experiments, including those undertaken by prominent
supporters of political deliberation. 8 In key ways, our design corresponds more
closely to the real world of such deliberation, both formal and informal. Our
findings therefore have implications for many questions in law and politics.
These include the likely judgments of three-judge panels consisting of all-
Republican appointees or all-Democratic appointees; the effects of freedom of
association; the performance of private or public boards of like-minded people;
and the consequences of movements-geographical, technological, or
7. See Shanto lyengar & Richard Morin, Red Media, Blue Media, WASH. POST,
May 3, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/03/
AR2006050300865.html.
8. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of James
Fishkin's studies).
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otherwise-that increase the likelihood that like-minded people will form
communities of their own.
In this Essay, we report the results of our experiment, offer an explanation
for our results, and provide some brief remarks on the implications of those
results for deliberation in politics. We suggest that the Colorado experiment has
analogies in many domains of democratic life. To be sure, we did not create the
kind of Deliberation Day favored by the most enthusiastic proponents of
deliberation in public life: we did not offer the various safeguards that they
propose, 9 and indeed our findings might well be taken to provide strong
support for those safeguards. But actual deliberation days, and weeks, will
often closely resemble our own experiment. As we shall show, our findings
offer a vivid warning about the consequences of sorting along political lines-
and suggest the need for careful design of any proposal intended to promote
political and legal deliberation.
I
POLITICAL DELIBERATION IN COLORADO
A. Study Procedures
Sixty-three voting-eligible adults between the ages of twenty and seventy-
five participated; thirty-four participants were women and twenty-nine werel0
men. Participants were recruited from two Colorado counties for a study on
opinions about social and political issues by a professional survey research firm
using random telephone digit dialing. Each participant received $100 for a two-
hour session. The choice of Colorado as the study's location was purely for
logistical convenience of conducting the study; a similar recruitment protocol
could have been followed in any state or geographical area.
The study drew half of its sample from Boulder County, which voted 67%
for Democratic candidate John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election. The
other half of study participants hailed from the city of Colorado Springs in El
Paso County, which voted 67% for Republican candidate George W. Bush in
the same election." The first and key level of screening for this study was
geographical. The study also screened the candidates individually, so as to
9. See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 3.
10. Consistent with the general demographics of the two counties, 90% of respondents
were white. In both counties, three of the five groups contained one non-white voter. There were
no significant differences between groups with and without a white voter on any group or
individual responses related to the affirmative action question.
There was no significant difference in age between the samples (the median age was forty-six in
both counties). Age did not have a significant effect on the willingness to change one's opinion-
the correlation between age and the extent to which a person changed his or her opinion in the
direction of the group was +. 12, which is not statistically significant in this sample.
11. CNN.com, 2004 Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/
pages/results/president (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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ensure that the Boulder participants held generally liberal political views and
the Colorado Springs participants had generally conservative political beliefs. 
12
Despite these general inclinations, we did not screen participants for their views
on the particular issues involved in the experiment, and many groups showed a
degree of pre-deliberation diversity on the issues that they were asked to
discuss. There were a total of five conservative groups and five liberal groups,
with five to seven members each.
In each county, participants came to a central location at a local university
for the study. In the first session, each person completed an individual
questionnaire about his or her private personal views on several topics.
Participants engaged in this task before being informed that they would be part
of a group discussion.
After all participants had completed their individual questionnaires, they
were moved to a different room and told that they would discuss some of the
issues as a group. The following instructions were read aloud (verbatim) by a
study administrator:
Next you will meet as a group to discuss some of the topics you just
considered in the survey. As a group, your job will be to try to reach a
consensus among you about each topic. As an individual, your job is to
express your personal opinion on each discussion topic, and to attempt
to reach a group consensus through discussion. You will have 15
minutes per topic.
One member of your group has been randomly selected to be the
'monitor.' The monitor's job is to (1) read instructions and questions
aloud to the group, (2) make sure the group performs each discussion
task in the proper order, (3) set the timer at 15 minutes for each
discussion and (4) record the group's final consensus opinion at the
end of each discussion.
The monitor will be given 5 numbered envelopes, which should be
opened in numerical order.' 3 For instance, the monitor will first open
12. Screening questions included the following: (a) "In general, would you describe your
political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?" (b)
"Suppose you were in the voting booth and you came across an office for which two candidates..
. were running and you had never heard of either one. Which candidate would you choose-the
Democrat or the Republican-or would you just not vote for that office?" Participants were also
asked to assign grades to various people, predicting how they would be as president. The
conservative names included Dick Cheney, Wayne Allard (the Republican U.S. Senator from
Colorado), Rush Limbaugh, and Pat Robertson. The liberal names included Edward Kennedy,
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Jesse Jackson, and John Kerry.
13. In the group sessions, the designated monitor was given five numbered envelopes, to
be opened in order as soon as the previous envelope's task was completed. The first three each
contained instructions for the group to discuss and reach a consensus, if possible, on one of the
three focal issues. A fourth contained individual forms, identical to those they completed before
the groups were convened, which asked for their private individual opinions on all three topics
after the group discussions were completed. The other envelope asked the group to discuss an
unrelated issue.
2007]
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Envelope 1, read the question and instructions inside to the group, and
then set the timer for 15 minutes. At the end of the 15 minutes, the
monitor will record the 'Group Consensus Opinion' (if there is
consensus), and then open Envelope 2.
Each discussion should last approximately 15 minutes. DO NOT take
straw votes until you are close to the end of your time-use the full 15
minutes.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Be sure not to close discussion before everyone
has had a chance to talk.
If you understand these instructions, you can open Envelope 1 and
begin discussion on the first topic.
Participants discussed each of the three issues as a group while being
videotaped and tried to reach a consensus-defined as a unanimous opinion-
in fifteen minutes of discussion. After the discussion, they filled out another
questionnaire in which they re-rated each issue privately as individuals.
B. Materials Given to Study Participants
Each group discussed the same three issues, and all members privately
rated their personal opinions before and after discussion on a one (Disagree
Very Strongly) to ten (Agree Very Strongly) scale.
Table 1. Rating Scale
Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree
Very Strongly Somewhat Slightly Slightly Somewhat Strongly Very
Strongly Strongly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The text of the three issues given to study participants said:
1. The United States should sign an international agreement to reduce
the greenhouse gases produced in this country that contribute to global
warming.
2. When different applicants for the same job or educational
opportunity are almost equal on relevant criteria, then the job or
admission should be given to members of groups in society that have
been discriminated against in the past.
3. Two adults of the same sex should be able to form a "civil union,"
which would entitle them to certain legal rights such as joint home
ownership, or access to the other's retirement or medical benefits.
We chose these issues because they divide people sharply along political lines
and have done so for a significant period of time. Undoubtedly, other political
issues would have worked as well. The first questionnaire also included
[Vol. 95:915
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demographic information and some filler items.
C. Study Results
The recruitment process was successful in assembling groups in Boulder
that were, on average, significantly more liberal than those in Colorado Springs
in their initial opinions.1 5 When combined across all three issues, individual
pre-deliberation opinions show substantial
counties. 16
Table 2. Summary of Individual Responses
Boulder (liberal)
Mean pre- Mean post-
deliberation deliberation
Moved
down
differences between the two
Stayed
same
Moved
up
groups
polarized
Global 9.19 9.44 5 18 8 60%
Warming
Affirmative 5.81 6.38 6 11 15 80%
Action
Civil 9.22 9.69 1 19 12 100%
Unions
Overall 8.07 8.50 12 48 35 80%
Colorado Springs (conservative)
Mean pre- Mean post- Moved Stayed Moved groups
deliberation deliberation down same up polarized
Global 5.13 2.97 2 7 3 100%
Warming
Affirmative 2.84 1.61 1 10 2 100%
Action
Civil 2.48 2.19 8 18 5 80%
Unions
Overall 3.48 2.26 48 35 10 93%
We now explore the effects of deliberation, separately analyzing the
consequences for individual views and the consequences for group decisions.
14. The filler items appeared in-between the three group discussion issues, and were:
"Having family members nearby is an important part of a good quality of life," "It is better to live
in the country than in the city or a suburb," and "The health care that I receive is worse than it was
in the past."
15. See infra Table 1.
16. A repeated measures ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) showed that there were highly
significant differences between the two samples in their pre-deliberation opinions on the issues to
be discussed: F(1,61) = 234.3, (p < .001). This difference was separately significant for each of
the three issues (each issue p < .001).
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1. Individual Mean Shifts Toward Extremity
The opinions of individuals showed consistent evidence of ideological
amplification. Six groups produced individual means that shifted in the same
direction as the general leaning of the group for all three issues, and the other
four groups did so on two of the three issues. There were a total of thirty group
discussions, or ten groups discussing three issues per group. Overall, then,
twenty-six of thirty discussions, or 87%, produced ideological amplification in
individual judgments. An analysis of the medians produced essentially identical
results.
This pattern of amplification is confirmed in a more formal analysis. For
all individuals, we subtracted pre-deliberation opinions from post-deliberation
opinions on each issue, so as to produce an opinion shift "difference score." For
the liberal groups, a positive difference would represent amplification, while a
negative difference would represent the same thing for the conservative groups.
This is in fact exactly what we observe, as Table 1 demonstrates. This
difference between geographical locations is highly significant, F(1,61) = 56.1,
p < .001, and is separately significant for each issue (global warming p < .001,
affirmative action p < .001 and civil unions p < .02). Thus we clearly observe a
shift toward more extreme opinions in both liberal and conservative groups, but
in opposite directions.
There is a small-but statistically significant-tendency for the
conservative groups to shift their opinions more, after discussion, than do the
liberal groups (p < .0 1). But it would be a mistake to pay much attention to this
difference. While some groups would undoubtedly shift more than others, the
difference found here is probably an artifact of the fact that on global warming
and civil unions, liberal groups were more extreme at the beginning, so that
there was less room for them to move after discussion. 17
2. Differentiation: The Gap Between Liberals and Conservatives
Liberals and conservatives have different opinions and beliefs about many
social and political issues, and it is no surprise that they might come to our
study with differences on the particularly salient and controversial issues that
we chose for discussion.' 8 Despite this general pattern of differences, before
deliberation there was actually a substantial amount of overlap between
opinions in Boulder and Colorado Springs. 
1 9
What is the effect of deliberation, by like-minded groups, on the
differences? The answer is simple: because of the ideological amplification
resulting from the group process, the initial gulf between opinions in the two
counties (8.07 for Boulder vs. 3.48 for Colorado Springs, a difference of 4.59)
17. See supra Table 1.
18. See supra Table 1. See also supra note 12.
19. See infra Figure 1, top panel.
[Vol. 95:915
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grew far wider (8.50 for Boulder vs. 2.26 for Colorado Springs, a now much
larger difference of 6.24, p < .001). Perhaps more disturbing, the distribution of
opinions is now heavily concentrated in the extremes, and most of the overlap
in opinions between the two locations has disappeared. 20 A main effect of
deliberation among like-minded people, then, was a growing gap between
liberals and conservatives.
Figure 1. Pre- and Post-Deliberation Distributions of Opinions
Distribution of Post-Deliberation Attitudes by Location60%1
0 Boulder
I U Colorado Springs
C
20%
10%
0% . .. .. .
Extremey Very Somewhat Slightly Slighty Somewhat Very Extremety
Conservative Conservative Conservative Conservative Conserative Uberal Uberal Uberal Uberal Uberal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Extremely Very Somewhat Slightly Slightly Soewhat Very Extrermety
Conserative Conservative Conservative Conserative Conserative Uber.l Uberal Liberal Uberal Uiberal
(0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
3. Reduced Internal Diversity
Another important question about deliberation is whether participants will
converge or diverge during and as a result of the process of deliberation. A
common method for measuring diversity in opinions is by their standard
deviation. The result is clear: the diversity of opinion within our groups, as
measured by the standard deviation of their ratings on an issue, was markedly
lower after deliberation. 21 The standard deviation of individual opinions in the
group was lower after deliberation for no fewer than twenty-nine of the thirty
group-issue combinations, and fell from a median of 1.17 pre-deliberation to
0.69 post-deliberation (z = 4.7, p <.001, by a sign test). In other words,
deliberation greatly decreased the heterogeneity of opinions within a group.
A similar pattern can be found if we look across groups within the same
county. The standard deviation among groups in Boulder declined from 0.67 to
0.51, and in Colorado Springs from 0.85 to 0.76. After deliberation, the
20. See infra Figure 1, bottom panel.
21. See infra Figure 2.
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opinions of even different groups of people from the same place were more
similar---despite not talking with each other. Overall, then, deliberation created
far more homogeneity of opinion within different groups from the same
geographical location.
Figure 2. Opinion Diversity Declines After Deliberation
Comparison of Pre and Post Standard Deviations of
Individual Opinions Within a Group
C.
2.5
"6o
.0, 2.0
0
.0
1.50
.0.
.0 1. 1.s 2. 0 2.5
Stdev of Pre-Discussion Opinions In a Group
3.0 3.5
4. Group Decisions
What is the relationship between pre-deliberation individual views and the
views of deliberating groups? This question is of independent interest. Much of
the time, what matters is what groups think and do as such, not only what their
members think and do as individuals. The basic answer is that group decisions
were more extreme than the mean or median of pre-deliberation judgments.
Overall, twenty-five of thirty groups, or 83%, reached a unanimous
decision on a numerical scale response within fifteen minutes-ten of ten on
global warming, seven of ten on affirmative action, and eight of ten on civil
unions. Among the twenty-five group-issue combinations on which a consensus
was reached, nineteen groups, or 76%, reached a consensus decision that was
more extreme than the mean pre-deliberation individual opinion of group
members. The same figure holds for median pre-deliberation responses.
HeinOnline  -- 95 Cal. L. Rev. 924 2007
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II
EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
On our Deliberation Day, individual liberals grew more liberal and
individual conservatives grew more conservative. Within groups, internal
diversity diminished, and the gap between liberals and conservatives grew.
Why did this happen?
A. Conformity, Ideological Amplification, and Group Polarization
1. Consensus and Polarization in General
When people discuss their beliefs and preferences in groups, consensus
increases for two reasons. The first involves basic conformity or herding habits,
which lead people to defer to the opinions of others-whether or not an
individual actually agrees with those opinions.22 The second is that people
learn from the information and views of others. As a result, discussion can
produce significant changes in points of view. 
23
Mere deference, in public, to the views of others would not always be
expected to affect anonymous statements of opinion. People's public statements
on an issue may well diverge from their private views.24 Indeed, we observed
greater diversity in people's anonymous statements than in the views of groups.
But when a group member has signed onto an official view, the private
statement might be affected as well-if only because it is disconcerting to
maintain a view in private that diverges from a statement made in public. 25 In
any event, group members who learn from one another are likely to be affected
in their anonymous statements as well as their public ones, and hence we
observe a significant increase in internal group consensus, even with respect to
privately held views, as a result of deliberation. That phenomenon has not been
studied extensively in empirical terms, but it seems familiar in many types of
groups, including political parties, religious organizations, university faculties,
labor unions, student groups, and corporate boards.
22. See Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL
ANIMAL 13 (Elliott Aronson ed., 7th ed. 1995); Leon Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison
Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954); Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of
Attitudes, 1 SOCIOMETRY 90 (1937). A good discussion of the effects of conformity can be found
in LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 28-30 (1991).
23. See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group
Judgment, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 149, 161-62 (1997); Reid Hastie, Review Essay: Experimental
Evidence of Group Accuracy, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 129,
133-46 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986).
24. See TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES (1995) (discussing general
phenomenon of "preference falsification," in which people's public statements are systematically
inconsistent with their actual private views).
25. See id. See also LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957)
(giving more information on the complex relations between public statements and private views).
2007]
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More strikingly, a well-known effect of discussion is group polarization,
by which deliberating groups end up in a more extreme position in line with
their pre-deliberation tendencies. 6 In our experiment, group polarization
occurred in the particular form of ideological amplification. We find
unmistakable evidence of group polarization on the current political and legal
issues discussed in this study.
Our findings are noteworthy because most studies of group polarization
do not involve legal or political issues. 2 7 The original polarization experiments
involved risk-taking behavior, with a demonstration that risk-inclined people,
when considering (for example) the decision whether to take a new job in a
new city or to become a concert pianist, became still more risk-inclined as a
result of deliberation.2 8 With respect to business-related decisions, groups
seemed to be willing to take risks that their individual members would avoid.29
Later studies of group polarization showed that under some conditions, the
"risky shift" could also be a "cautious shift," as risk-averse people become
more averse to certain risks after speaking with one another. 30 It tumed out that
the direction of the shift-toward greater risk-taking or greater caution-was
related to the domain of experience in which the risky choice was embedded.
The principal examples of "cautious shifts" involved the decision whether to
marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain,
possibly requiring medical attention. In these cases, deliberating groups
together moved toward a more cautious approach, as did the individual
members who composed each of the groups.
32
26. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (2d ed. 1986). Two of the present authors
have discussed this phenomenon in other places. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group
Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law of Group]; David Schkade et
al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1139 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble].
27. See BROWN, supra note 26, at 200-245 (studying group polarization).
28. See J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decision Involving Risk
(1961) (unpublished Master's thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with
Massachusetts Institute of Technology). An interesting replication of Stoner's findings can be
found in Lawrence K. Hong, Risky Shift and Cautious Shift: Some Direct Evidence on the Culture-
Value Theory, 41 SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 342 (1978). Hong finds that Americans are more risk-inclined
in groups than as individuals with respect to the decision whether to take a new job, have a heart
operation, buy stocks, choose a risky play in football, invest in a foreign country, choose a risky
move in chess, become a concert pianist, and run for political office. Interestingly, Chinese
subjects showed a cautious shift for all these questions, with a single exception: choosing a risky
play in football.
29. Stoner, supra note 28; Hong, supra note 28 (finding a risky shift for American
subjects).
30. See Serge Moscovici & Marisa Zavalloni, The Group as a Polarizer of Attitudes, 12 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 125, 125-35 (1969). See also Hong, supra note 28.
31. See Moscovici & Zavalloni, supra note 30. See also Hong, supra note 28, at 344
(finding a cautious shift for both Chinese and American subjects with respect to the decision
whether to marry).
32. See Moscovici & Zavalloni, supra note 30.
[Vol. 95:915
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More careful analysis of these results demonstrated that the pre-
deliberation median is the best predictor of the direction of the post-
deliberation shift.33 Where group members were predisposed toward risk-
taking behavior, a risky shift was observed. Where members were more
disposed toward caution from the beginning, a cautious shift was observed.
Hence, group polarization refers to the tendency of deliberating groups to shift
to a more extreme position in line with the pre-deliberation tendencies of their
members. Ideological amplification, as we use the term here, is best understood
as a special case of group polarization.
In the behavioral laboratory, group polarization is evident in a remarkably
wide range of contexts, including robbery, aesthetic judgments and factual
observations. 34 For instance, even groups of burglars can show a shift in the
cautious direction when they discuss prospective criminal endeavors. 35 Group
deliberation produces more extreme judgments about the attractiveness of
people shown in slides.36 Deliberation can also produce more extreme group
judgments for obscure factual questions, such as how far Sodom (on the Dead
Sea) is below sea level. 37
Our focus here has been on disputed political questions. In the domain of
law, there is some evidence of group polarization as well. In punitive damage
cases, deliberating juries have been found to polarize, producing awards that
are often higher than those of the median juror before deliberation begins. 38
When individual jurors begin with a high level of moral indignation about a
defendant's conduct, juries become more indignant after deliberation than their
median member had been before discussion. This effect ultimately produces
dollar awards that are often as high as or even higher than the highest award
favored before deliberation by any individual juror. 39 Group polarization also
occurs for jury judgments of guilt and sentencing in criminal cases. 40 With
respect to legal questions, panels of appellate judges polarize too. In
ideologically contested areas, Republican appointees show especially
conservative voting patterns when sitting on panels consisting entirely of
Republican appointees, and Democratic appointees show especially liberal
33. See id. See also BROWN, supra note 26, at 210-12.
34. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION THEORY 142-70 (1987).
35. Paul F. Cromwell et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69 PSYCHOL.
REP. 579, 586 (1991).
36. TURNER ET AL., supra note 34, at 153.
37. Id.
38. See Schkade et al., supra note 26.
39. See id. (finding that in 27% of the cases, the jury's award was as high or higher than
those favored by any individual juror before deliberation).
40. David G. Myers & Martin F. Kaplan, Group-Induced Polarization in Simulated
Juries, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 63 (1976); Martin F. Kaplan, Discussion
Polarization Effects in a Modified Jury Decision Paradigm: Informational Influences, 40
SOCIOMETRY 262 (1977).
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voting patterns when sitting solely with other Democratic appointees.4'
There is also suggestive evidence of group polarization on political issues.
As a result of deliberation, French people, on average, become more distrustful
of the United States and its intentions with respect to foreign aid.42 Similarly,
feminist ideals can become more attractive to women after internal group
discussions.43 White people who are not inclined to show racial prejudice show
less prejudice after deliberation with one another than before; but white people
who are inclined to show such prejudice show more prejudice after deliberation
with group members holding similar views.
44
2. Sorting versus Mixing
In our experiment, people were sorted into like-minded groups.
Geographical factors-the different voting patterns in Boulder and Colorado
Springs-greatly simplified this sorting process. Such sorting was a central part
of the design of our study, because we were explicitly interested in the effects
of deliberation among and across like-minded groups. As we suggested, actual
sorting appears to be increasing in geographical terms, as geographically
defined areas within the United States are becoming more uniform in their
political commitments.4 5 In addition, virtual sorting across political lines is far
easier with the rise of media organized along ideological lines.4 6
It is natural to ask what would have happened if there had been a degree
of mixing-if people from Colorado Springs had participated in groups with
people from Boulder. Advocates of deliberation typically prefer heterogeneity
rather than uniformity. 4 7 Mixing might have occurred voluntarily, as it often
does. Alternatively, mixing might have been engineered by the experimental
design. In terms of ultimate outcomes, existing work suggests two principal
possibilities. First, and most likely, the pre-deliberation median might well
have been predictive here as well, in the sense that it would likely predict both
the group's decision and the shift in individual views.4 8 Suppose, for example,
that a group of six people tended to oppose civil unions for same-sex couples,
41. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID A. SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL]; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004)
[hereinafter Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting].
42. BROWN, supra note 26, at 224.
43. David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 HuM. REL. 699, 707-
11 (1975) (finding increase in support for feminism among women inclined to show feminist
attitudes).
44. David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, Discussion Effects on Racial Attitudes, 169
SCIENCE 778, 778-79 (1970).
45. See Bishop, supra note 5.
46. See id.
47. See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 3.
48. See BROWN, supra note 26, at 210-12.
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because two members sharply opposed them, two members mildly opposed
them, and two members mildly favored them. In light of the initial distribution
of views, the group and its individual members would probably move in the
direction of greater opposition, notwithstanding a degree of internal
heterogeneity. In many settings, the pre-deliberation median is the best
predictor of the movement of individual and groups, even if there is a degree of
antecedent heterogeneity. 49 Note, in this regard, that all of the groups in our
study began with some such heterogeneity, and they nonetheless moved in the
way predicted by group polarization research. As discussed below, this
conclusion follows from an understanding of the sources of polarization.
The second possibility is that individual positions will be further
entrenched in their preexisting views and will fail to move at all, as group
members may show a reluctance to listen to those with competing positions.
Polarization may not be found when the relevant group consists of individuals
drawn equally from two extremes. 5° Consider the finding that "familiar and
long-debated issues do not depolarize easily." 51 We have said that ideological
amplification generally occurs in the federal judiciary. 52 But on two issues-
capital punishment and abortion-Republican appointees are not affected by
sitting with two Democratic appointees, and Democratic appointees are
impervious to the influences of two Republican appointees. 53 Evidently judicial
judgments about abortion and capital punishment are firmly held and hence
amplification does not occur. For political issues on which people do not have
rigidly determined positions, polarization is more likely, as our own experiment
suggests.
Mixed groups have, however, been shown to have two desirable social
effects. First, exposure to competing positions generally increases political
tolerance.54 After hearing a variety of views, including those divergent from
their own, many people become more respectful of alternative positions and are
more willing to consider them plausible or legitimate. An important result of
seeing a political conflict as legitimate is a "greater willingness to extend civil
liberties to even those groups whose political views one dislikes a great deal.,
55
Second, mixing increases the likelihood that people will be aware of competing
rationales and will see potential counterarguments.56 This effect is especially
pronounced for those who antecedently show a "civil orientation toward
49. See Schkade et al., supra note 26, at 1140-41 (finding that the pre-deliberation
median predicts movements, even when there is considerable internal diversity).
50. See E. Burnstein, Persuasion As Argument Processing, in GROUP DECISION MAKING
(Hermann Brandstetter et al. eds., 1982).
51. BROWN, supra note 26, at 226.
52. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL, supra note 41, at 22-24.
53. See id. at 62-63 (discussing decisions of three-judge panels).
54. See MUTZ, supra note 4, at 76-77.
55. Id. at 85.
56. Id. at 74-76.
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conflict," in the sense that they are committed to a degree of social harmony
and are willing to acknowledge, in advance, that dissenting views should be
expressed. 57 These desirable effects of deliberation within mixed groups will
not be realized in any deliberative process in which people are sorted, or sort
themselves, into politically homogeneous groups.
B. Explaining Polarization
Why does group polarization occur, and what accounts for such
ideological amplification? Contributing factors include (a) informational
influences, (b) corroboration effects, (c) social comparison, and (d) shared
identity and self-categorization.
58
1. Informational Influences
The first and perhaps most important reason is that group members
provide relevant information. 59 In Colorado, group members were willing to
consider both the conclusions and the arguments offered during deliberation.
For example, skeptics made slippery slope arguments about same-sex marriage,
expressing the fear that further changes to the institution of marriage will be
difficult to prevent if that institution is not limited to one man and one woman.
With respect to affirmative action, those rejecting color blindness emphasized
the long history of discrimination in the United States and argued that a
principle of color blindness might return the nation to a time of greater racial
inequality. Group members were responsive to both of these concerns.
In any group with some initial inclination, the views of most people in the
group, and the information that they have and that they provide, will inevitably
tend in the direction of that inclination. Suppose, for example, that most
people in a group believe that an international treaty to control global warming
is a bad idea. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring that initial position
will be more numerous than the arguments pointing in the other direction.
Individuals may have been exposed to some, but not all, of the arguments that
emerge from group deliberation; perhaps they will not have heard concerns
about the expense of international controls, the dangers of ceding national
controls over energy policy, or the possibility that global warming will have
only modest adverse effects for the United States. As a result of hearing the
various arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme point
aligned with the initial beliefs of group members. Through this process, many
57. Id. at 75.
58. See BROWN, supra note 26, at 212-22, 226-45; Robert S. Baron et al., Social
Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537 (1996).
Overlapping accounts are provided in Schkade et al., supra note 26, and Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble, supra note 26.
59. BROWN, supra note 26, at 217-22.
60. Id. at 219.
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minds can polarize, and in exactly the same direction.
2. The Effects of Corroboration and "Self-Discovery"
The second explanation stresses the close links among confidence,
extremism, and corroboration by others. 61 If people lack confidence, they will
tend toward the middle and avoid the extremes. 62 As people gain confidence,
they usually become more extreme in their beliefs. 63 Agreement from others
tends to increase confidence, and in this way like-minded people become more
certain they are right and thus more extreme after deliberating with each
other. 64 In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people's opinions have
been shown to become more extreme simply because their views have been
corroborated, and because they have become more confident after learning that
others share their views.
65
A process of this kind undoubtedly occurred in Colorado. Within both
liberal and conservative groups, some people began with a degree of
tentativeness, in a way that moved them toward the middle of the relevant
scale. 66 After hearing both conclusions and arguments that fortified their
original inclinations, they moved, with remarkable regularity, to a more
extreme position.67
A distinctive but related account of group polarization, and hence
ideological amplification, suggests that deliberation can operate as a form of
14,,68
"self-discovery. This account begins with the observation that particular
people are likely to find particular arguments especially persuasive.
Fundamentalist Christians might be convinced, for example, that climate
change, induced by some human beings to the detriment of other human beings
and the natural world, is inconsistent with their deepest theological
commitments. For those who think about political issues, some reasons are
"active," in the sense that they are known to be valid and relevant, whereas
other reasons are "latent," in the sense that people are uncertain of their
pertinence and strength, but might be much affected by them if they are pressed
in deliberation. 69 When people find themselves in groups of like-minded
people, their latent judgments are made active, as others press reasons in favor
61. See Baron et al., supra note 58, at 557-59 (showing that corroboration increases
confidence and hence extremism).
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Baron et al., supra note 58 at 541, 546-47, 557 (concluding that corroboration of
one's views has effects on opinion extremity).
66. See supra Figure 1, top panel.
67. See supra Figure 1, bottom panel.
68. See Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, Deliberation and Social Polarization, Jan. 25,
2006, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-887634.
69. Id. at 2.
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of those judgments. It is in this sense that deliberation can operate as a form of
"self-discovery," producing ideological amplification. This account is also
consistent with what we observed in Colorado.
3. Social Comparison
The third explanation involves social comparison. 70 Sometimes people's
publicly stated views are partly a function of how they want to present
themselves. 71 People usually want to be perceived favorably by other group
members. 72 Once they hear what others believe, some will adjust their
positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position, to present
themselves in the way that they prefer.
Reputational concerns are only part of the story here; people also want to
preserve their preferred self-conception, and if they ordinarily think of
themselves slightly left-of-center, they might shift a bit, in a liberal group, in
order to preserve that self-conception. In a liberal group, movements in the
liberal direction will be favored and, for this reason, all members might end up
leaning somewhat more to the left. This explanation fits well with the changes
we observed.
4. Shared Identity and Self-Categorization
A great deal of research indicates that group polarization is heightened
when people have a sense of shared identity. 73 People may polarize because
they are attempting to conform to the position they see as typical or normative
within their own group. If a group's particular identity is especially salient, the
in-group norms "are likely to become more extreme so as to be more clearly
differentiated from outgroup norms, and the within-group polarization will be
enhanced.",74 When Democrats or Republicans polarize, the desire to ensure
intergroup differentiation is likely a motive. In our own experiment, many
groups were even more prone to polarization when their discussions referred to
groups with whom they disagreed, such as "those loony liberals" or "those
crazy conservatives."
C. The Limits of Polarization: Diverse Deliberation Days
We have traced several social-cognitive processes that contribute to
ideological amplification within like-minded groups: (1) informational
70. See BROWN, supra note 26, at 213-17.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 209-11; TURNER ET AL., supra note 34, at 159-70 (discussing evidence for
the "self-categorization theory of polarization"); Joel Cooper et al., Attitudes, Norms, and Social
Groups, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF GROUP PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 259, 269-70
(Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., 2001).
74. TURNER ET AL., supra note 34, at 210.
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influences, (2) corroboration effects, (3) social comparison, and (4) shared
identity and self-categorization. An understanding of these processes suggests
that political deliberation is extremely likely to lead to ideological
amplification. It also suggests circumstances that may dampen or prevent
ideological amplification. Imaginable interventions might produce different
kinds of shifts and could either intensify or dampen amplification.
1. Informational interventions. We could easily imagine that information
flows could affect amplification. Suppose, for example, that we gave the
Boulder participants credible information suggesting global warming is not a
particularly serious problem for the United States, that affirmative action
greatly hurts those whom it is intended to help, or that civil unions for same-sex
couples provide few benefits to such couples while posing legitimate threats to
children. Such information could counteract the dynamics of ideological
amplification, especially if the participants had some reason to trust the source
of that information.
For instance, participants may trust news sources that share their political
beliefs.75 If we told participants from Colorado Springs that President Bush
supported a treaty to control global warming or that Vice President Cheney
favored civil unions for same-sex couples, some of them would likely be
76influenced, especially if arguments supported the relevant views. On the other
hand, a deliberately balanced presentation that offers plausible arguments from
both sides should diminish the effects that produce ideological amplification.
2. Administrators, moderators, and leaders. Administrators, moderators,
and leaders might affect and perhaps even prevent ideological amplification. If
group members trust them, administrators can dampen amplification by
countering the group's prevailing tendency and attempting to prevent extreme
movements. Alternatively, deliberation could include planted members-
confident, likeable, and apparently expert group members who are actually
confederates of the experimenter. These confederates should be able to increase
or to decrease amplification.
77
75. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group
Influence On Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003) (showing that
identification of a political party's view greatly affects people's judgments on political issues,
enough so as to press them away from the view that they would otherwise hold).
76. See id. (noting that the policy favored by the relevant party affected participants'
views, even without supporting arguments); See also World Public Opinion.org, Global Warming,
http://americans-world.org/digest/global issues/global warming/gw2.cfln (last visited Feb. 2,
2007) (noting that about 70% of Americans favor the Kyoto Protocol to curtail global warming
but that figure drops to about 43% when people are informed that President Bush rejects the
Kyoto Protocol).
77. Sherif, supra note 22. A good outline can be found in Ross & NISBET, supra note 22,
at 28-30. For demonstrations of the powerful effect of a confident confederate on the views of
group members, See Robert Jacobs and Donald Campbell, The Perpetuation of An Arbitrary
Tradition Through Several Generations of a Laboratory Subculture, 62 J. ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCH. 649 (1961); Gregory Moschetti, Individual Maintenance and Perpetuation of A
Means/Ends Arbitrary Tradition, 40 SOCIOMETRY 78 (1977).
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 95 Cal. L. Rev. 933 2007
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
The group's assessment of administrators or confederates as relatively
similar or relevantly different will affect their influence on the group. 78 In our
experiment, deliberators attempted to reach a group decision, and they
succeeded in doing so in 83% of group discussions. The effects we describe
would likely diminish if experimenters asked deliberators to speak to one
another without reaching a decision and then polled privately on their views.
3. Other Deliberation Days. With respect to the effects of information
flows and administrators, there is no need to speculate here. James Fishkin, an
advocate of a Deliberation Day with balanced presentations of views, has
illuminatingly explored the idea of a "deliberative opinion poll," in which
diverse people are asked to engage in deliberation about various issues.
79
Fishkin finds significant changes in individual opinions, suggesting that
deliberation is having a large effect, but he does not find a systematic tendency
toward ideological amplification. 80 In England, for example, deliberation led to
reduced interest in using imprisonment as a tool for combating crime even
when there was no antecedent hostility to the use of imprisonment.8 In the
United States, deliberation increased the percentage of people holding a
minority position about some issues. For example, deliberation led to a jump
from 36% to 57% of people favoring policies making divorce "harder to get."
82
Before deliberation, 36% of people agreed that the "biggest problem facing the
American family" is "economic pressure." After deliberation, that number
jumped to 51%.83 By contrast, the percentage believing that the biggest
problem is the breakdown in family values fell from 58% to 48%.84 These
changes are very different from what we observed in Colorado, and they do not
show ideological amplification.
The deliberative opinion poll uses several of the interventions described
above. A trained moderator oversaw Fishkin's groups to ensure a level of
openness and likely altered some of the dynamics that produce amplification.
85
Fishkin also presented participants with a set of written materials that attempted
78. See Wendy Wood et al., Minority Influence: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social
Influence Processes, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323 (1994) (exploring when minority has impact and
when it does not).
79. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY
161-81 (1995) (hereafter FISHKIN, VOICE OF THE PEOPLE). For valuable and up-to-date materials,
See JAMES FISHKIN, CTR. FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATIVE POLLING®: TOWARDS A
BETTER-INFORMED DEMOCRACY, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/summary (last visited Mar. 5,
2007) (hereafter FISHKIN, DELIBERATIVE POLLING)
80. See FISHKIN, DELIBERATIVE POLLING, supra note 79.
81. Id. at 178-79.
82. FISHKIN, DELIBERATIVE POLLING, supra note 79; See also FISHKIN, VOICE OF THE
PEOPLE, supra note 79, at 22 (showing an increase, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.40 to 1.59 in
commitment to spending on foreign aid; also showing a decrease, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.38 to
2.27 in commitment to spending on social security).
83. FISHKIN, DELIBERATIVE POLLING, supra note 79.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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to be balanced and that contained detailed arguments supporting competing
positions. 86 In our study, people relied only on the beliefs, information, and
values they brought with them to the room. Fishkin's balanced presentation
would likely influence people in a way that simple group discussion without
external materials would not. Whatever the experimenter's goals, the materials
that are provided will undoubtedly affect the direction that deliberation will
take group members.
Finally, Fishkin instructed his participants not to reach a group decision,
and the absence of such a decision probably attenuated the influences discussed
here. We have suggested that when individuals commit themselves to a group
judgment, it is likely that their individual responses, even if anonymous, will be
somewhat affected by that commitment. To disclose a private judgment that
diverges from one's public judgment is certainly possible, but it produces a
degree of dissonance, which is often resolved in favor of the public statement. 87
Group polarization has been found after mere exposure to the arguments of
other group members, but it is typically smaller than after discussion and group
judgment. 88
It is tempting to explain Fishkin's results by noting that his groups were
diverse and did not consist of like-minded people. But the temptation should be
resisted. Even if a group has a degree of internal diversity on some question,
the pre-deliberation median is a good predictor of the post-deliberation median,
at least if individual views are not entrenched.89
It would be most informative to test the effects of a variety of
interventions into deliberative processes in order to see their various
contributions to ideological amplification or dampening. It would also be
informative to conduct deliberative opinion polls specifically testing the claim
that deliberating groups will reach the correct result on political questions that
have answers that can be shown to be right. We do not know whether a
hypothesis of that kind might be vindicated. Undoubtedly, there is a
relationship between the nature of the interventions and the likelihood that the
group will arrive at the truth.
There is no question that other Deliberation Days, offering distinctive
safeguards and procedures, would have different consequences from those we
found in Colorado. Our only suggestion here is that on political issues, the
likely result for deliberating groups, unaccompanied by an external moderator
or a set of independent arguments, is amplification of preexisting views,
86. Id.
87. See ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION ch. 3
(1993).
88. See BROWN, supra note 26, at 220 (noting mere exposure produces significant shifts).
89. See id. at 210-11; Schkade et al., supra note 26, at 1140-41 (finding that pre-
deliberation median is predictor of shift, whether or not there is internal diversity before
discussion began).
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especially if group members are asked to reach a collective decision.
D. Implications
Does ideological amplification lead to accurate or inaccurate answers? Do
deliberating groups err when they polarize? No general answer would make
sense. A great deal will turn on the relationship between the correct answer and
the group's pre-deliberation tendencies. If the group is leaning toward the right
answer, polarization might lead them directly to the truth. But there are no
guarantees here. When individuals are leaning in a direction that is mistaken,
the mistake will be amplified by group deliberation.
Consider some results from domains in which mistakes and biases can be
identified without taking a controversial stand on normative issues. With
respect to questions with correct answers, deliberating groups tend to do about
as well as or slightly better than their average member, but not as well as their
best members. 90 Further, deliberating groups do not reliably arrive at the
correct answer.9 1 Group polarization occurs when jury members are biased as a
result of pretrial publicity; the jury as a group becomes more biased than the
individual jurors.92 When most people are prone to make conjunction errors
(believing that A and B are more likely together than A or B alone), group
processes lead to more errors, not fewer.93 The propensity to make conjunction
errors is amplified, rather than reduced, by deliberation, apparently as a direct
result of the mechanisms discussed here. Hence it is possible to show that in
many domains, deliberation results in an amplification of individual mistakes.
94
When individuals show a high degree of bias, groups are likely to be more
biased than their median or average members. 95 It is true that deliberating
groups do well on "eureka" problems-those for which the answer is obvious
once announced. 96 It has been found, for example, that when sending and
receiving information is costless, groups do significantly better on math
problems than do individuals, apparently because people are able to recognize a
90. See Gigone & Hastie, supra note 23.
91. See id. at 161-62 (summarizing findings that groups do not perform as well as best
members); Hastie, supra note 23, at 133-49. To the same effect, see also Garold Stasser & Beth
Dietz-Uhler, Collective Choice, Judgment, and Problem Solving, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
GROUP PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES, supra note 73, at 31, 49-50 (collecting findings).
92. Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality, in JUDGMENTS,
DECISIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 116, 127-28 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002).
93. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 692 (1996).
94. William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group Judgment:
Error in the Treatment of Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147,
152-54 (2002).
95. See MacCoun, supra note 92.
96. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 60-61
(2006).
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correct answer as such. 9 7 But many problems do not have this feature because
the correct answer is not immediately recognizable, and hence group error is
pervasive.
More generally, a comprehensive study demonstrated that majority
pressures can be powerful even for factual questions on which some people
know the right answer. 98 The study involved 1200 people, forming groups of
six, five, and four members. Individuals were asked true-false questions
involving art, poetry, public opinion, geography, economics, and politics. They
were then asked to assemble into groups to discuss the questions and produce
answers by consensus. The clearest result was that the views of the majority
played a large role in determining the group's answers. When a majority of
individuals in the group gave the right answer, the group's decision followed
the majority in no less than 79% of the cases. The truth played a role too, but a
lesser one. If a majority of individuals in the group gave the wrong answer, the
group decision nonetheless moved toward the majority position in 56% of the
cases. Hence, the truth did have an influence-79% is higher than 56 0/o-and
this is a definite point in favor of the potentially beneficial effects of
deliberation. But the judgment of the majority, and not the truth, was the
dominant influence. And because the majority was influential even when
wrong, the average group decision was right only slightly more often than the
average individual decision (66% versus 62%).
There is a final question. Is our experiment representative of the effects of
political deliberation in most domains? We specifically attempted to ensure that
our deliberating groups would consist of like-minded people. And it is
reasonable to think that much of the time, real-world deliberation looks a lot
like our experiment. To be sure, deliberation sometimes occurs within mixed
groups, showing far more diversity than those assembled in Boulder and
Colorado Springs. As we have seen, mixed groups are also likely to amplify
preexisting tendencies, but that pattern is not inevitable, 99 and such groups
have significant advantages, mostly because of the potential effect of minority
positions. 100
Yet it is plausible to suggest that some countries, including the United
States, operate to a greater or lesser extent as a collection of special interest
enclaves, in which people are especially likely to associate and deliberate with
97. See Mathew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating
Improve Decisionmaking?, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9, 27-29 (2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-900258. Note that when receiving information is costly, individuals did
not do better with deliberation than on their own. See id. at 28-32.
98. Robert L. Thorndike, The Effect of Discussion Upon the Correctness of Group
Decisions, When the Factor of Majority Influence Is Allowed For, 9 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 343, 348-
61 (1938) (exploring effects of both correctness and majority pressure on group judgments).
99. See supra text accompanying note 50.
100. See the discussion of minority influences in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT 30-32 (2003).
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others who agree with them. 101 To the extent that migration patterns are now
producing more homogeneous subcultures, routine exposure to diverse
opinions may become less likely for many people. 102 Similar results might be
produced and reinforced by the rise of highly specialized information sources,
above all the internet, which makes it increasingly easy for people to avoid
opinions that differ from theirs. 103 Indeed, there is a well-documented tendency
for people to seek information that confirms their existing beliefs and to avoid
or devalue disconfirming information ("confirmation bias"). 10 4 The ease of
finding confirmatory evidence is likely to increase the balkanization of opinion.
Consider in this regard an illuminating little experiment. 105 Members of a
nationally representative group of Americans were asked whether they would
like to read news stories from one of four sources: Fox (known to be
conservative), National Public Radio (known to be liberal), CNN (often thought
to be liberal), and the British Broadcasting Network (whose politics are not
widely known to Americans). The stories came in different news categories:
American politics, the war in Iraq, racial issues in America, crime, travel, and
sports. It turns out that for the first four categories, Republicans chose Fox by
an overwhelming margin. By contrast, Democrats split their votes between
National Public Radio (NPR) and CNN, while showing a general aversion to
Fox. For travel and sports, the divide between Republicans and Democrats was
much smaller. By contrast, independents showed no preference for any
particular source. In a sense, the experiment showed that private choices tend to
replicate our Colorado study, with people gravitating toward stories that shared
their antecedent views.
There was another finding, an equally striking one: the network label
greatly affected people's level of interest in the same news stories. For
Republicans, the identical headline became far more interesting, and the story
became far more attractive, if it carried the Fox label. In fact the Republican hit
rate for the same news stories was three times higher when it was labeled "Fox
News." Interestingly, the hit rate also doubled when sports and travel stories
were so labeled. Democrats showed a real aversion to stories labeled "Fox
News," and the CNN and NPR labels created a modest increase in their
interest. The overall conclusion is that Fox attracts substantial Republican
support and that Democratic viewers and readers take pains to avoid Fox-
while CNN and NPR have noticeable but weak brand loyalty among
101. See Bishop, supra note 5; See also Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency,
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75 (2006).
102. See Bishop, supra note 5.
103. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (forthcoming 2007) for discussion. The
Internet also makes it very easy to encounter new and different positions. Ideological
amplification might well be less likely if people use the Internet to find such positions.
104. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).
105. See Iyengar & Morin, supra note 7.
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Democrats. This is only one experiment, to be sure, but there is every reason to
suspect that the result would generalize-that people with identifiable leanings
are consulting sources, including websites, that match their predilections, and
are avoiding sources that do not cater to those predilections.
It is important to note that there is a distinction between deliberating
groups that attempt to reach a shared conclusion (as in our study) and
deliberating groups that simply talk (as in Fishkin's studies). Amplification
might well be heightened for the former groups; and many real-world groups
talk without having to reach a shared conclusion. To this extent, such groups
may not show the same degree of amplification that we find. Recall, however,
that mere exposure to the views of other like-minded people can produce group
polarization. 106 For this reason, we anticipate that movements of the kind found
in Colorado, even if somewhat smaller, would also be found without group
decisions.
Nothing said here denies that deliberation might be structured so as to
diminish the likelihood of ideological amplification; we have seen that neutral
arbiters, providing information and helping to manage discussion, might have a
substantial effect. Various efforts to prime participants might also influence the
effects of deliberation. If participants are reminded of the 9/11 attacks, or of
events that cast a favorable or unfavorable light on certain positions or even
officials, they are likely t9 be affected, perhaps in a way that will diminish the
effects found here. 10 7 But whatever the intervention and priming effects, the
outcome of our experiment offers important cautionary notes about the
consequences of deliberation on political judgments. Ideological amplification,
and not necessarily reason or truth, may well be the result of political
deliberation, at least if group members share antecedent commitments.
There is a final point. If deliberation results in ideological amplification, it
does not follow that deliberation has moved group members in the wrong
direction. Suppose that after deliberation, group members become especially
hostile to affirmative action or especially receptive to same-sex unions. Has
deliberation helped or hurt? Any answer would have to turn on some judgment
about the merits. With a factual question, we can readily test whether members
have been led to error or truth. But with some questions, no such test is easily
available. If amplification occurs, perhaps groups are led, much of the time, in
the right direction.
Nonetheless, we should be suspicious of situations in which social
interactions lead people to believe a more extreme version of what they thought
before they began to talk. If group members were exposed to competing
arguments, and to a range of perspectives, at least there would be greater reason
106. BROWN, supra note 26, at 220.
107. See THOMAS PYSZCZYNSKI ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF 9/l: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TERROR (2003).
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for confidence that ultimate conclusions were not an artifact of artificially
limited "argument pools."
CONCLUSION
As a result of deliberation with like-minded others, liberals became more
liberal and conservatives became more conservative. On some of the largest
issues of the time, discussions by like-minded group members fueled greater
extremism, and increased divisions between liberals and conservatives. At the
same time, both liberal and conservative groups became more homogeneous;
deliberation significantly reduced internal diversity.
We have emphasized that our Deliberation Day was not the same as every
imaginable deliberation day, and that many advocates of more deliberation
argue in favor of distinctive safeguards and procedures that might ensure
different results from those that we have described here. But there is every
reason to believe that results of that kind occur not simply in experimental
settings, but in many real-world domains in which citizens and officials engage
in political discussions with one another--especially if they sort themselves
into actual or virtual groups of like-minded people. Those who seek to foster
broader deliberation, or to celebrate deliberative conceptions of democracy,
would do well to keep these points in view.
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